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Incomes Policy in Kenya: , Need. Criteria and Machinery*'"*" 
Introduct ion 
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss criteria and machinery 
for the implementation of an incomes policy for Kenya; Since, however,•there. 
are many who remain sceptical of the need for any sort of incomes policy, it is 
necessary to argue a case for it in the East African circumstances. Thus the 
earlier part of the paper deals with the need for an incomes policy in Kenya; 
while the subsequent sections dwell on the appropriate criteria and machinery 
for policies on wages, salaries and profits. There is no separate discussion 
of the peasant sector except in so far as it has implications for other types 
of incomes. 
Need for an Incomes Policy. 
The current interest in incomes policy in East Africa has been 
stimulated by concern over the failure of employment to expand over the last 
decade and'the widening of rural/urban income differentials. It is felt that 
a-continuation of the above trends would jeopardise the achievement of national 
economic and. social goals such as a high rate of growth of the economy, rapid 
expansion.of employment opportunities and equitable distribution of incomes. 
Incomes policy is. therefore, being advocated to achieve the following objectives: 
a) promotion of a more equitable income distribution 
. b) rapid expansion of employment opportunities 
c) prevention of inflation and balance of payments difficulties. 
We shall consider each of these objectives in the context of the.Kenya 
economy. 
a) Income distribution 
Gross inequalities of income distribution are a relatively well known 
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and reasonably well documented feature of the East African economies. 
From the point of view of incomes policy, two aspects of this question 
are of particular interest:' income differentials between unskilled'1 urban. . 
workers and peasant farmers5 and the differentials between skilled persons 
(salariat) and capitalists on the one hand, and wage earners and peasant farmers 
on the other. The nature of the problem ma}- be vividly illustrated with a few 
key statistics. 
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Peasant-Unskilled Worker Income differentials. 
The income differentials between peasants and urban unskilled workers 
are considerable and have been increasing in recent years. The average 
. earnings of African employees in:Kenya rose from £68 in 1950 to £135 p.a. 
.in 1966. This represents a cumulative increase of about 12% p.a. If we 
exclude agricultural employees, average urban African earnings rose from £97 
in 1960 to £180 in 1966 - a compound increase of nearly 11% p.a. These figures 
cannot be taken as a measure of the increase in average wages of unskilled 
African employees. They have been affected, on the one hand,, by the additional 
5 
coverage of 1964, which had the effect of lowering average earnings by- 2.7%. 
On the other hand, the upgrading of African employees during this period, the 
most obvious and most Important example of which is Africanisation of better paid 
jobs, had the effect of raising average African earnings. Unfortunately, since 
no data are available on the distribution of African earnings since 1960» it 
is difficult to separate out the effect of the latter movement on average 
earnings. It appears reasonable to assume that wages unskilled urban ' * - * g 
workers have probably increased at a rate of about 10% p.a., since 1950. Since 
the Nairobi cost of living index for wage earners has risen merely by. 14% 
between 1960 and 1956, most of the increase being concentrated in 1965-6.6, it 
is clear that the real income of unskilled urban workers has risen by about 
8% p.a. over this period. 
In contrast to this, the gross domestic product (G.D'.P. ) measured 
at current prices rose by 41% or at an annual rate of 6.0% over the same 
7 period, while monetary • G.D.P.' increased at a slightly lower rate of 5.7% p.a. 
Thus wages for unskilled urban workers have increased by slightly less than. . 
double the rate of G.D.P. growth since 1960.' It is notoriously.difficult 
to. make similar calculations for the small farm sector. Nevertheless, some 
rough estimates must be presented for- illustrative purposes. In 19150 •> the 
subsistence output was estimated at £50.2 m, while the cash income'Of the small 
farm sector amounted to .about £9.5m.9 On the assumption that in 1960 a total of 
1.04 million adult males derived their/livelihood from cash or subsistence 
agriculture, the per family .income comes to £57, the cash component of which 
amounts to £9.1.10 . The corresponding.1.966 figures for'subsistence.and cash 
income are £75.3m and £19.7m. Assuming an adult male population of 1.24 
millions, this gives us per household income of £77.4-, the cash component of 
which amounts to £15.9. Thus average peasant household income.went up by-
near ly 35% between 1960 and 1965, while the cash income increased by. about 75%-, 
the annual growth rates, therefore, amount to about 5 and 10% respectively. 
It will, therefore, be seen that while their cash incomes have grown at roughly 
the same rate, average total income of farmers has risen at about half the 
rate of unskilled, urban workers. In absolute terms, the average wage of 
urban unskilled worker would appear to be twice that of the average peasant 
11 household. The above estimates are subject to a considerable margin of 
1? error. Nevertheless, the overall picture they reveal of wide and increasing 
differentials between peasant farmers and unskilled urban workers is almost 
, • . , 13 certainly true. 
Salariat and Capitalists 
The second aspect of inequalities in income distribution relates to 
income differentials between skilled, persons and capitalists, on the one hand, 
and unskilled workers and peasants on the other. Following Green's definition 
of salaries as employee incomes above £50 per month, then the 41,000 salariat, 
comprising about 7% of recorded employment of 589?000, received nearly 44% 
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of total employment income in Kenya in 1964. Another measure of the 
tremendous differentials between the earnings of skilled and unskilled 
employees, is given by the fact that whereas in the public sector the current 
wage for subordinate staff in large urban areas is £120 p.a., the starting 
salary for graduates is about £304, or about seven times as much. The fringe 
benefits, particularly pension schemes and housing subsidy, further reinforce 
the differential between salary and wage earners. In addition, while virtually 
all the salary earners are on incremental salary scales, wage earners in the / 
lowest income brackets do not receive any_automatic annual increasesIn the 
private sector, annual increments in general are not automatic for salary 
earners, but the end result is not much different from that in the public 
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We have unfortunately much less information on the distribution of 
income among unincorporated.businesses (including professionals) and owners 
of.corporate, enterprises. The only readily available source of data are the 
income tax statistics. These show that the average income of unincorporated 
businesses in 1964 was £1783, while that of "controlled companies'1' was £4297. 
Assuming an average of three persons per controlled company, average income 
•• . lr per person in 'controlled companies' comes to £1432. These figures illustrate 
the enormous gap between the incomes of capitalists and of skilled persons, on 
IS the one hand, and of unskilled workers and peasant farmers on the other. 
An important objective of public economic policy is "to move towards 
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a more equal income distribution. It can be argued that fiscal rather incomes 
policy is the appropriate means to achieve a desired pattern of income 
distribution.' Indeed fiscal.policy is. inherently a more effective instrument 
of income redistribution since it takes .int.o. account individual ability to pay 
whereas incomes policy works largely by affecting group or factor incomes.; 
and there may be considerable inequalities of income distribution within a 
group, such as peasants or capitalists, which cannot be reduced directly by 
incomes policy.- However, in actual practice because of the political and 
administrative difficulties encountered in devising an appropriately progressive 
tax structure-, fiscal policy cannot serve as a complete substitute for incomes 
policy 5.n reducing relative income differentials; this is particularly true 
of the gap. between the incomes of wage- earners and farmers. Moreover, even if 
there were no case in equity, for initiating an incomes policy, the need for 
securing a rapid growth in employment would necessitate sor.e sort of incomes 
policy. We now turn to this aspect of the argument. 
b) Employment and incomes policy 
Expansion of employment opportunities, along with economic growth, 
is an important social and economic objective of the East African countries. 
Yet experience in this respect has been disappointing: recorded employment in 
Kenya in 1965 was 10% lower than in 1960, in Uganda it had marginally declined 
between 1960 and 1965, and in Tanzania it fell by 14% over the same period. 
This despite the near boom conditions throughout East Africa since 1963. 
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The phenomenon of stagnation or decline in employment in the face of 
substantial increases in production has excited much academic speculation 
but so far little hard empirical research. However, there appears to be 
widespread agreement that the rapid increase in wages of unskilled workers 
in recent years has contributed in an important way to stagnation in 
recorded employment."^ . 
: More specifically, it has been argued that the rapid increase in 
wage rates has forced employers generally to economise on labour by using it" 
more efficiently, has stimulated the adoption of.more capital intensive 
techniques of production, and has probably resulted in the relative shrinkage 
of the labour intensive product and services sectors. 
It would appear that a continuation of thO past trend in wage rate 
increases would'make it'virtually impossible to achievethe target rate of" 
•increase, itr-employment laid down in Kenya's Development Plan. In an open, 
predominantly agricultural economy such as that of Kenya, wage rate increases 
in^  excess'of producti-vity; increases may be expected to have an adverse effect 
on employment. Let us classify 'employees into'three sectors: export sector, 
public sector arid' the rest of the economy- Employment in the export sector, and 
more particularly in the agricultural export sector, is likely to be very 
sensitive to changes in- wage rates. Given constant or in some cases falling 
prices, excessive wage rate increases will lead to a fall in employments caused 
partly by a fall in production and partly by substitution of capital for labour. 
In the public sector, employment in local government will also be adversely 
affected by a substantial rise in wage rates, as local authorities typically., 
have highly inelastic tax systems. These two sources provide a very substantial 
proportion of the total recorded employment in Kenya. Employment in the other 
sectors of the economy may not be so .sensitive, to excessive wage rate increases, 
as it is possible to nass on the increased labour costs, in the-form r.of higher 
prices for goods and services. But even here, the combination of the 
depressive effect of fall in export earnings and competition" from foreign 
imports, -may limit' price rise and hence lead to a fall in employment. It will, 
therefore, be seen that excessive wage rate increases wili lead to a fall in 
employment in the short-run, and in the' longer run will lower the rate of 
expansion of employment. 
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c) Inflation and Balance of Payments 
Owing to lack of data, it is not possible to assess the effect on 
the prices of domestically produced goods and services of wage rate increases 
of recent years. Even if in the past, rapid wage rate increases have been 
absorbed through advances in productivity, the scope for similar striking 
improvements in productivity in the future will be less. It is, therefore, 
quite likely that wage rate increases, of a; magnitude experienced in the last 
IS six years could generate wage inflation.. 
The likely implications for balance of payments follow directly from 
our discussion of the employment effects of excessive wage rate increases. 
The main adverse effects are likely to flow from a fall in agricultural exports 
and a loss. in .the competitive position-of domestic manufactures vis-a-vis 
foreign imports in the.East African market. .There might also be a reduction 
20 
in capital inflows qwing to lower profitability of investment in.new projectsy".; 
However, to the extent that foreign prices, rise at the same rate at .domestic;-o . 
prices, the effect of rapid wage increases will be felt, largely, through decline 
in agricultural export earnings. Although balance of payments .is not a current 
constraint on the growth of the economy, it is likely to become one in the not, . 21 
too distant a. future.. :This, therefore, is an additional reason for initiat-
ing a policy of restraint in wage and salary increases. • 
The arguments presented in the preceding sections have attempted to 
shew that it would be desirable to initiate incomes policj' in Kenya in order 
to promote a more equitable distribution of incomes, to secure rapid expansion 
in employment opportunities, and finally to prevent inflation and balance of 
payments difficulties. The following sections are devoted to a discussion of 
the criteria and machinery needed to implement an incomes policy designed to 
achieve the above objectives. He start with wages, and then proceed to a 
consideration of salaries", profits and prices. 
National. Wages Policy: _ _ _ -
... The main characteristics of the market . for unskilled labour in Kenya... ; 
may be restated and summarized as follows: (i) the .existence of. ..excess supply., 
at the. existing wage rate i-e. unemployment of unskilled persons. ..,...,. .,., 
(ii)' considerable divergence in wage rates as between different industries 
and different firms within' an industry 5 (iii) a substantial rate of 
increase in wage rate's in recent years despite the existence of unemploy-
ment (iv) stagnation' in the volume of recorded employment. The phenomenon 
of increasing wages in the face of considerable and growing volume of un-
anploymen't is to be explained by the passage of successive minimum wage laws 
and moire recently by the power of trade unions to wrest wage increases from 
the employers ' 
All three objectives of incomes policy listed earlier would- be 
furthered by a moderation of wage-rate increases for unskilled persons. Can 
we say anything about the appropriate.size of increase in wage rates? The 
Paretian criteria for optimum resource allocation would imply a fall in the 
price of labour. This is clearly unrealistic... In the predominantly private 
sector economy of the Kenya type, the most that can realistically be.achieved 
is a substantial lowering., of the rate ..of wage increases experienced in recent 
years. The two obvious methods of determining-the advance ,o.f the incomes of 
unskilled workers are increases,.-in productivity and the growth of peasant -
incomes. The rationale, behind the productivity criterion presumably- is that 
its application will ensure price stability. This makes sense in fully employed 
developed economies where the main problem is external equilibrium; hence 
it is vital to secure price stability. In economies with considerable un-
employment. productivity criterion does not make much theoretical sense, 
especially if productivity increases are brought about largely by substitution 
of capital for labour. In addition, there are also practical difficulties in 
the application of this criterion. Statistical data on productivity are scanty 
and for some important sectors non-existent. While, therefore, it may be 
difficult to base wage rate increases on productivity increases at a macro 
level, the productivity criterion, as will be shown below, has a role to play 
in providing continuing incentives for'increasing labour efficiency and flexi-
bility in wage' structure at the micro level, 
1 Since one of"the objectives of an incomes policy is to reduce 
differentials between the incomes of smallholders and unskilled urban 
employees, and since the supply of labour in the employment sector is affected 
most fundamentally by peasant incomes, it is natural to relate wage rate 
increases to growth in peasant incomes. According to the Kenya Development 
Plan, peasant cash crop production, livestock and subsistence output are 
projected to increase at 1964 prices, at an annual rate of 17.8%, 10.3% 
and 3.2% respectively. This works out to an annual growth in peasant incomes 
of about 6%.. " Allowing for a 3% annual increase in the peasant population, 
average peasant (household) income has been projected to rise by 3% p.a. 
This figure does not make any allowance for the decline in prices of 
agricultural products. In actual practice, peasant incomes have increased 
by about 7.4% p.a. since 1964 at current prices, arid possibly more at 1964 
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prices. It may, therefore, be more realistic to assume an increase in 
average peasant income of 4-5% p.a. . If we.are to prevent a widening of the 
relative gap in rural/urban incomesand hopefully .to narrow it .in the future, 
the overall increase in the wage rate of unskilled employees .must be limited 
to 4%p.a. The essence of the proposal made here is to base wage rate 
increases on a moving average of increase in average .peasant;income over the 
last- three to four years. This will have the advantage of tying wage rate 
increases to increases in peasant incomes, while at the same time eliminating 
t 25 difficulties arising from frequent fluctuationsrof farm incomes. Moreover, 
the' permitted increase in wage rates can be determined fairly easily, from 
the regularly published statistics. 
Three obvious objections against the above proposal are that (a) 
it will have an adverse effect on the supply of labour to the employment 
sector, (b) it will impair incentives to raise productivity, and (c) it will 
introduce undesirable rigidity into the wage structure. Under the present 
conditions of excess supply of unskilled labour and overwhelming attraction 
of urban jobs, the first objection is largely academic. Should there be 
a scarcity of unskilled labour in the future, the problem could be met 
easily by permitting wages to rise faster. The other two objections are 
more serious and a way must be found of incorporating incentives and 
flexibility in the operation of the wages policy.. One way of doing this 
would be to have a system under which wage rate increases uDto a certain 
figure, say 3%, would continue to be subject to negotiations between 
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employers and unions as at present; but any demands for wage increases 
above 3% would be submitted to a government appointed board. The board 
would have a discretion to award wage increases in excess of 3% and upto a 
maximum of 6%. In deciding on wage awards, it should be guided by the following 
principles; (i) if productivity increases are in excess of the permitted 
increases in wage rates, and if these increases could be attributed directly 
to increased efficiency or effort of workers, then higher increases in wage 
rates could be justified. This would have the important effect of providing 
•'';'"•' 2 6" ' continuing incentives for productivity increases on the part of workers. 
Although it is difficult to state in general terms the operational rules for 
attributing productivity increases to different factors of production, the 
detailed study of individual cases should reveal the main agents of improvements 
in productivity, (ii) If there is a scarcity of certain types of labour, 
extra wage rate increases could be awarded to induce workers to. take up these 
jobs. This would make for a more efficient working of the labour market'. • 
(iii) Higher increases might be awarded to workers at the•lowest rung of the 
wage scale.for. unskilled workers, in order to reduce income differentials 
amongst .workers themselves. ' 
Two further points should be made: the overall annual increase in 
wage rates should not exceed 4%, and wages should be defined as including all 
fringe benefits such as holiday, working time, social security contributions etc. 
Apart from the advantages of incentives and flexibility, the scheme 
outlined here has the virtue of involving minimal departure from the-established 
system of wage negotiations. For its successful working, it will be necessary 
to provide deterrents to ensure that all wage, claims are not automatically 
taken to the board for settlement. These could take the form of a fee, or an 
obligation to meet expenses, etc. in the event of no award decision by the 
board. 
Machinery for Wages Policy : • . . . • 
It is proposed that. National Incomes Board be;established to implement 
the government's incomes policy.; As far as wages are concerned, the board will 
be charged with the responsibility of considering wage demands in excess of the 
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permitted increment. In addition,-it - will be required to formulate minimum 
wages and orders relating to wages and'conditions of service in particular 
industries. The board will thus take over the functions of the Wages 
Council and of the Ministry of Labour in •determining certain wages and conditions 
of service.. The. board should consist of three independent members of high 
competence and standing appointed by the government. Because of the technical 
nature of its functions, it will be necessary to provide it with a small 
professional staff with expertise iri statistics, accountancy and economics. 
The board will'keep under review:trends in such significant variables as 
national income., peasant incomes, employment, wages, productivity, profits and 
prices. It, will be required to issue six monthly reports, reviewing the progress 
of its work. - / 
It is an open question whether the existing Industrial Court could be 
transformed into the National Incomes Board. The Court was„established in; 1954 
to arbitrate on the disputes between unions and employers. However as.currently 
constituted, it suffers from the fact that it operates without the benefit of 
v 
centrally issued criteria on wages policy. Thus inevitably the Court's 
decisions are influenced by a desire to resolve conflicts in terms which would 
be. acceptable to both parties. In the first two years of its operation, the 
wage rate, increases .granted, often 'amounted to 10% or more. It has thus added 
to the upward bias in wage settlement already inherent in the existing machinery 
of wage determination. It has also suffered from the fact.that it has lacked 
access to expert advice. If the court is to serve as an instrument of national 
incomes policy, it will be necessary to effect drastic changes in its present 
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functions, staff and membership. 
Salaries Policy 
Most of the discussions on incomes policy have tended to concentrate 
on wages to the exclusion of salaries and other types of income. This is 
unfortunate not only because of the great disparities in incomes between 
capitalists and salariat on the one hand, and peasants and unskilled workers 
on the other, but also because neglect of other incomes will seriously .-.,-. - • 
jeopardise the acceptance of a national wages policy on the lines indicated 
earlier. Before discussing the policy alternatives for salaries, it may be 
useful to summarise the main characteristics of the market for skilled 
: -j-• i :.:..' • 2 8 
laDour in Kenya. 
Jn'contrast to unskilled workers, the market for skilled labour is 
characterised, by excess demand/: The total stock of skilled labour force may 
be divided into• three categories: local persons, expatriates provided to the 
public sector by foreign governments and international organizations at prices 
considerably below their true supply price, and expatriates recruited in the 
world market. Expatriates constitute a significant proportion of the total 
stock of skilled manpower. The public sector is by far the most important 
employer of skilled labour and as such effectively determines the salary and 
terms of service for skilled persons. Whereas the wages of unskilled workers 
are determined in the domestic economy, the salaries for skilled labour reflect 
the market conditions in Europe. The expatriate salaries are in general . 
substantially higher than those of their local counterparts. Finallyalthough 
there continues to be a tightness in the skilled labour market, the supply 
position is changing rapidly with an increasing flow of local skilled persons 
coming on the market. Most of the following discussions about salaries is 
concerned with local skilled persons. 
Because of the large differentials in the remuneration of skilled and 
unskilled employees, there is a strong equity case for reducing these different-
ials either by a freeze on salaries, or more effectively by an actual reduction 
in salary scales. However, in view of the continuing shortage of skilled 
manpower, we must weigh the equity requirements against the economic costs, if 
any, of such a policy. These may conveniently be considered under two heads: 
effect on the demand and the supply of skilled labour. On theoretical grounds, 
one would expect an increase in quantity demanded of skilled labour both 
because of substitution of skilled for unskilled labour and because.the demand 
for products where skilled labour is an important input will increase relative 
to the demand for other products. The,ability of the public, sector to employ 
more skilled persons will also be enhanced. It is clearly not possible to 
estimate the magnitude of this effect. Provided the barriers to .inflow of 
fn"PAl crn sir 1 1 1 prt m^T!T1ruf.T»"n ^ mc^  ^ pcoH fhoyiD -nc.^ ^ ita -nr\ l'ni-aTicifTratiAri n-F fho 
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excess demand for labour. The economic costs of reducing the salaries 
of local skilled persons are, therefore, confined to the inefficient use 
of skilled labour, i.e. the substitution of skilled for unskilled persons. 
It is a matter of judgement as to how strong this effect might be. Consider-
ing the large .differentials in the remuneration of skilled and other employees, 
. . ' " " , art . boaa 'v&d* J&P8B© oic nmoqam tail*** 0*1*™ 
ift?can -be-1 argued that'the 'substitution effect may. be quantitatively in-
significant. 
Another argument against lowering relative price of skilled labour 
that is often put forward relates to the adverse effect this will have on its 
supply. There are two aspects of this question: effect on the existing 
stock and on the future flow of skilled labour. It is not possible to say 
a priori how sensitive is the international mobility of local skilled labour 
to changes in salaries. Because of the close links among the three East 
African countries, one would expect a certain amount of mobility within 
East Africa. But Tanzanian salaries for local skilled persons are already 
considerably below their counterparts in Kenya and Uganda. It is, therefore, 
doubtful whether there would be much outflow of skilled persons from Kenya to 
other parts of East Africa. Similarly, unless there is a drastic reduction of 
salaries; say by 50%, it would appear that the outflow of local skilled persons 
in the foreseeable future to countries outside East Africa need not present 
90 
much of a problem."* Should there, however, be a serious drain of local 
skilled manpowers if is open to the government to raise the price of emigration 
by say, the imposition of an emigration tax. 
- The adverse effect of a reduction in salaries on the future supply 
of skilled" labour is likely to be negligible. Not only are the returns to 
skills so relatively high that only a drastic reduction of salaries will 
.significantly affect the attractiveness of acquiring skills, but under the 
present system in Kenya most of the costs of higher training and education 
are borne by the state. The main constraint on the supply of skilled labour 
is provided by the capacity of the training institutions and not by lack of 
demand for such facilities. It seems unlikely, therefore, that say a 10 to 
15% reduction in the salaries will have much of an impact on the flow of 
skilled manpower. 
It does not3 therefore, seem to me that the economic costs of a 
reduction in salaries will be significant. To the extent that there are 
marginal adverse effects, they are likely to be outweighed by the gains 
resulting from this policy. These gains are:(i) a more equal distribution 
of income (ii) greater acceptance of controls on wages (iii) enhancement of 
the ability of the public sector to expand its social and economic services 
and undertake development projects (iv) favourable impact on imports of 
consumer goods. 
As far as the existing stock of local skilled labour is concerned, 
any proposal for reduction in salaries will naturally generate fierce opposition. 
Moreover, the salariat are strongly entrenched in positions of power and 
policy-making; in the absence of a powerful political leadership, dedicated 
to egalitarian principles, it may prove virtually impossible to enforce a ."' 
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reduction in the earnings of the salaried group. . The second best alternative 
of a freeze in salary scales .may prove-more acceptable. But. under the present 
system, this automatically ensures to most salary earners, at any rate in 3? 
the public sector, an annual increment of 2 to 5%. " Thus if incomes policy 
is to be effective in reducing differentials between skilled and unskilled 
persons, it is essential to reform the salary structure either by abolishing 
the principle of automatic increments and equating increments up the scale to 
promotion, or by granting increments every three years or so, thus effectively 
reducing the annual increment. 
The prospects of. enforcing a reduction in the salaries of new entrants 
to the labour force appear, more favourable. This may be achieved effectively 
by any of the following three methods: (i) lowering of the current salary 
scales, either by having lower salary or higher qualifications for the same 
job;j (ii) financing of higher education by loans, which would be repayable 
33 over a specified period and carry a rate of interest; (iii) a compulsory 
3u 
national service for a specified period, at a salary below the current rates.. 
If-the objective is to reduce the present value of the stream of earnings of 
skilled labour by a certain figure, this could be achieved theoretically by 
all three methods. However, there are some important differences among them 
with respect to incidence, equity and administrative and- economic efficiency. 
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The first alternative of a straight salary cut will presumably apply 
in the first instance to new employees in the public sector \ it may prove 
difficult to enforce the cut on the private sector directly. On the other 
hand, since. it is.the public sector which effectively! determines the salaries 
for skilled employees, the salaries in the private sector may be adjusted 
downwards in line with those in the public sector. From an administrative 
point of view, this alternative is: superior to loans and national service. 
Likewise, it would appear to involve smaller "psychological, costs" for those 
affected by it than the other alternatives. National service could be so 
devised as to be applicable to all new entrants to the skilled labour force. 
While it has this advantage over other alternatives, it is likely to raise 
considerable administrative problems, and if experience in other countries is 
any guide it may also be wasteful in the use of the skills made available. 
Furthermore, it will probably be less acceptable to those affected by it than 
the other schemes in so far as the latter interfere less with the individual 
choice of occupation. 
The loan scheme can only apply to thos6 whose higher education has 
been financed by the state. Thus a,considerable number of those taking up 
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salaried jobs will, therefore, be outside its scope. This in itself might 
generate considerable resentment and •hostility to the scheme. It is also 
likely that a loan scheme might involve greater psychological costs and thus 
have a more adverse effect on the supply of skilled manpower than the other 
methods of reducing the earnings of skilled labour. Finally, there is a lag 
of several years before a loan scheme can become effective in reducing salaries. 
The weight of the arguments.presented above is in favour of relying 
on direct salary cuts as a means of reducing the income of new entrants to 
the skilled labour, force.in preference.to national service or loan financing 
of education. A reasonable, figure for salary reduction might be 10 to '20%, 
the rates increasing progressively for higher salaries. Most: of the entrants 
to the skilled labour force would, in fact fall in the: lower brackets'of the 
salary structure in the early years.... The initiative for salary revision would 
clearly have to come from the Government and would in the first instance apply 
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to the public sector. The National Incomes Board would be charged with the 
function of ...reviewing matters .relating, to salaries; and one of its first 
tasks inr.this. connection would, be to devise techniques and procedures for' 
extending the revised salary scales to new skilled employees in the private 
sector. 
Profits and prices policy,.,: ....-... ; . . . 
It is more difficult and less desirable to have the same sort of 
controls on profits as have been proposed for wages and salaries. For one 
thing, profits fluctuate a good deal from year to year, rising sharply in boom 
years and falling in recession. Secondly, the rate of profit on the capital 
employed varies enormously from firm to firm, and from industry to industry, 
reflecting differences in risk, managerial efficiency and sheer luck. Thirdly, 
since profits are. the main source of investment funds in the private sector, 
any kind .of. direct control over them could have serious adverse effects .ion 
private investment. It,would, therefore., be preferable to adopt indirect 
measures to achieve the main objectives of incomes policy with respect to . 
profits- ,.••.. 
If the proposed policies on wages and salaries are accepted and 
implemented, it is possible that there may be a rise in the share of profits 
in national income. This would probably be acceptable in a largely socialist 
economy. But in a predominantly private enterprise economy such as that of 
Kenya, a rise in the share of profits, while desirable from the growth point 
of view, will worsen income distribution and jeopardise wages policy. In order 
to deal with this situation, it will be necessary to rely on fiscal and prices 
policy. The corporate tax is already quite high in East Africa, amounting to 
40% of net profits. Taking into account the surtax on distributed dividends, 
the effective rate of taxation of business profits probably amounts to more 
than 50%. Thus the government will be one of the principal beneficiaries of 
a rise in the share of profits. It is doubtful whether corporate tax can be 
raised much further without affecting foreign private investment in the country. 
On the other hand, there is considerable scope for further reform of the business 
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tax system. The most urgent need in this area is the improvement of procedures 
for the assessment of incomes of private companies and unincorporated enter-
prises, in order to reduce tax evasion through underdeclaration of incomes. 
The role of the price policy is to ensure stability in the worker's 
cost of living index, which is essential for the success of the wages policy, 
and to prevent the earning of excess profits by firms enjoying monopolistic 
powers. The government is already responsible for the fixing of prices of a 
wide range.of goods, which figure heavily in the. budgets of low income groups. 
Supplemented by selective subsidies of a temporary nature,"this should enable 
the government to achieve reasonable stability in the low income cost of 
living index. , 
It is more difficult to devise means to control the pricing policies 
of monopolistic firms. A substantial proportion of the manufacturing and 
services sector is dominated by monopolistic and oligopolistic structures. 
Unlike many industrial countries, East African countries do not have any 
public bodies whose function is to keep a check on the activities of 
monopolistic firms. This role could be performed by the proposed National 
Incomes Board. The main objectives here are.1 to ensure that the market power 
•is not used.to raise prices when there is no adequate justification for it, 
and;more positively to. induce firms to reduce prices when productivity increases 
are in excess of wage rate, increases and other costs have not risen. The 
implementation of these policies, however, is likely to prove extremely 
difficult. It is easier to prevent unjustified price increases then to secure 
37 
price reductions. If the board is to discharge its functions adequately in 
this respect, it' would need to have access to detailed data on the cost and 
price structure, .'of a wide range of industries. Planned variations in import 
duties and direct pressure oh firms would be the main means of influencing 
the price'policy of: firms. In addition the government could use its'immense 
powers .as a purchaser of.these goods and services to encourage price reductions. 
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Conclusion: 
It has been argued above that in the interests of equity and a 
rapid expansion of employmentit is desirable to introduce controls-to 
slow down the increase in wage rates to 4% p.a. A proposal designed to achiev 
this.objective" involving minimum .interference with the existing machinery of 
wage negotiation was put forward. With respect to salaries., the best 
practicable alternative would appear to be to freeze the salary scale,at its 
existing level for the present holders of salaried jobs, and to lower the 
salaries for future entrants to the skilled labour force. Profits should 
be regulated through a combination of fiscal and price policies. 
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responsible for the remaining errors. 
i» - The Report to the Government of. the United Republic of Tanzania on Wagss, 
Incomes and Prices Policy, by International Labour Office, (Government 
Printer, Dar es' Salaam, 1967), and the accompanying White Paper on 
Wages, Incomes, Rural Development, Investment and Price Policy, (Government 
Printer, Dar es Salaam, 196-7.), were unfortunately published only after this 
paper had been substantially completed. It has, therefore, not been possible 
to comment in detail on the. analysis and recommendations of these important 
documents. It is, however, gratifying to note my own analysis of the 
problem confirmed by the authoritative I.L.O. Report. 
2. See, among others, D»P. Ghai, Some Aspects of Income-Distribution in East 
Africa, East African Institute of Social Research, E.D.R.P. paper 52, 
(Mimeo) for racial inequalities;, Report of the Salaries Review Commission, 
1967, Kenya Government, pp. 15-23 (Government Printer, Nairobi) for rural-
urban differentials. R. H. Green, Wage Levels, Employment, Productivity 
and Consumption, in Education, Employment and Rural Development, edited 
by J.R. Sheffield (East African Publishing House, 1967) for wage and salary 
differentials. 
3. In the terminology used here, skilled persons (salariat) are defined to 
include professional, managerial, administrative and technical personnel*, 
while wage earners comprise the rest of the employees including not only 
the unskilled workers but also what is often called the middle-level 
manpower such as clerks, salesmen, primary school teachers, artisans, minor 
technicians etc.; where the argument relates to unskilled workers among 
wage earners, they are so distinguished in the paper. 
All these figures unless otherwise stated are obtained from Economic Survey, 
Kenya, various years. 
5. In 1964, the average earnings of the additional coverage of 39,300 African 
employees was £56 compared with £70 for other employees. Since the additional 
coverage represented an increase of 13.5% in the enumeration of African-
employees, it pulled the average earnings down by 2.7%. 
6. Analysis of the Industrial Court wage awards since its establishment in 1964, 
and of four important firms since 1960 shows that wages of unskilled 
employees have increased by about 10% p.a. 
7. This apparently surprising result is due to the fact that whereas 
subsistence output was depressed in 1960, it was at a record level in 
1966. All these figures are based on the old G.D.P. estimates. 
8. The same sort of picture emerges both in Uganda and Tanzania. In Tanzania 
the average yearly increase in cash wages has been 17% between 1960 and 
1966, while G.D.P. at current prices has risen annually by 6.7%; I.L.O. 
Report, op. cit. p. 4; Background to the Budget, 1967-68 (Government 
Printer, Dar es Salaam). 
9. For a variety of reasons such as the failure to estimate rental income and 
the inadequate coverage of cash sales, this is almost certainly an under-
estimate of the real income of peasant farmers. 
10. Calculated from the Revised Development Plan, Kenya, p. 102. 
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11. It must also be remembered that whereas average wage represents the 
earnings ox a single person, the average peasant income is a return to 
the labour (and land) of'the entire household. Thus; the differences in 
the average income of the unskilled urban worker and the peasant are 
substantially greater than-suggested by the above figures. 
12. Apart from statistical weaknesses, there are many other factors which make 
a simple comparison between incomes of peasants and urban workers hazardous; 
see Report of the Salaries Review Commission, op. cit., pp. 20-21. 
13. Similar trends are observable in Uganda and Tanzania: see J.15. Knight, 
The Determination of Wages and Salaries, in Uganda, Table 3, in Bulletin 
of the Oxford University Institute o,f Economics and Statistics ,. Vol. 29, 
No. 3,' 1967 pp. 233-264, and I.L.Q. Report, p. 5: "There seems no doubt 
that there is' a very large' discrepancy between the living standards of 
the average wage earner and the average smallholder,, and that this 
discrepancy has substantially increased in recent years." According, to the 
. Report whereas'wage earners in 1966 were'over twice as well off in terms 
of real income .as in 1960, "it does not appear that the .smallholder's 
average real income for 1966 is likely to be more than 5% above 1960-62 
figure." . 
14'. R.H. Green, Wage'Levels, Employment, Productivity and Consumption, op. cit. 
tables I and II.. 
15. A company, is controlled unless there is a public holding of more than 25% 
of the voting'power and of equity; public for this purpose excludes 
relations and nominees of other persons. This distinction between 
controlled and non-controlled companies has now been abolished.. 
16. The figure on average capitalist income must be treated with ••'caution,. Income 
tax statistics exclude very small enterprises and thus exaggerate the 
average income of unincorporated enterprises. On the other hand, they 
almost certainly understate the true income of. both unincorporated enter-
prises'and controlled companies.. 
17. This is defined as bending inwards of the Lorenz Curve of income 
distribution. 
18. See, for instance, Economic Survey, 1967,'Kenya, pp. 85-86; Work for 
Progress, Uganda's Second. Five-Year Plan, p. 146; I.L.0..Report, op. cit. 
pp. 8-9, where it is stated that econometric analysis shows that at current 
levels of labour efficiency in Tanzania, and at the recent rates of 
improvement in; labour efficiency, if average wages and salaries etc. .rise 
by 15% p.a., Employment will fall by 5% p.a.'; if the former rise by 10% 
p.a., the latter will fall by 2g% p.a., and if they rise by 5% p.a., 
employment will rise by 5% p.a. Azarias Baryaruha, "Factors Affecting 
Industrial Employment. A Study of Ugandan Experience. 1954-19.64p. 80 
Oxford University Press, Nairobi. 
19. It appears that this may already have started in Tanzania: see I.L.0. 
Report, p. 11. ' .' , t . ' 
20. The force of. all these arguments is increased by the. recent, devaluation 
of sterling and the non-devaluation of East African currencies. 
21. According to the projections' made-.'in -the; De^icpment-'-Fl^ 
on current account of £10.6 m. is expected to be converted into a deficit 
of £26.5 m. by 1970. 
22. I. have discussed this phenomenon in some detail in my paper, '.'analytical 
Aspects of an. incomes Policy for Kenya" , pp. 7ri0, Discussion.Paper No. 50, 
Institute for Development Studies, University College, Nairobi (m.imeo) 
For. a similar explanation of rising wages in conditions, of excess, supply 
of unskilled labour in Uganda, see J.B. Knight, Determination of. Wages and 
. Salaries, in Uganda, op. cit. He attribute's, the rise.to government policy, 
trade union pressures and employers' enlighteament. 
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23. 1964: £ m 1970: £ tn 
Subsistence Output 68.5 82.4 
Cash crop production 10.5 28.1 
Livestock • 3.4 6.1 
Total ' 82.4 116.6 
24. Based on old "calculations of G.D.P. ' 
25. The I.L.O. Report recommends that minimum wages should be fixed in relation 
to smallholder's income. But it proposes a different system - the proficiency 
wage - for determining wages above the minimum;/ The overall ceiling of 
5% annual increase presumably reflects the maximum increase in wages and 
salaries bill consistent with-projected increases in employment. 
26. Productivity may increase for several reasons: additional effort or 
efficiency of workers, more and better equipment per worker9 and improved 
management. There is no reason why workers should get extra benefits for 
productivity increases brought about solely by more capital and better 
management. It is one of the weaknesses of the I.L.O. Report that in 
arguing for a closer relation between wage and productivity increases, it 
does not distinguish among different causes of increases in productivity. 
27. For a detailed analysis of the working of the Industrial Court, see Dharam 
Ghai and Charles Kollen, "Kenya's Industrial Court - an Economic Analysis",, 
forthcoming Discussion Paper, Institute for Development Studies, University 
College, Nairobi. 
28. These are described in detail in my paper, Some Notes on Labour Markets in 
East Africa,. Staff Paper, Institute for Development Studies, University 
College, Nairobi (mim'eo). 
29. It would be interesting to see the extent of outflow of skilled manpower 
in Tanzania' following the recent reduction in salaries of senior Civil 
Servants, My own impression is that it has been negligible. It is doubtful 
whether there has even been a net flow from the public to. the private 
sector where salaries have been maintained at their old level. 
30. Several developing countries, such as U.A.R., and India, which have ..suffered 
considerably from "brain drain", do already operate some controls on the 
flow of skilled labour. If developed countries do not permit the inflow 
of unskilled labour in the :,interests" of their- economy, is it that' 
outrageous to suggest that developing countries might impose, controls on 
the outflow of skilled labour to safeguard their economies? 
31. This is no doubt the reason why,, barring a few exceptions, most African 
countries have failed in their attempts to reform their salary structures 
inherited from the colonial era. 
32. The annual increments built into various salary scales appear to be quite 
•haphazard; they bear no relation to considerations of equity or economic 
efficiency. " 
33. For a detailed discussion, in the Kenya context, of the financing of 
higher education through loans, see Daniel C. Rogers, "The Returns to 
Investment in Higher Levels of Education in Kenya," Discussion. Paper 
No. 59, Institute for Development Studies, University College, Nairobi, 
(mimeo). 
34. Tanzania has utilized, both lower salary scales, and national service to 
reduce the earnings of skilled workers. In October, 1966'the'Tanzanian 
government announced salary, reductions ranging from 20%.in -the-case of 
ministers and top civil servants down to 3% in the case of civil servants 
earning from £660 to'£900 a year. At the same time, national service was 
introduced;: college and university leavers were required to.serve for two 
years at 60% of their normal salary. The first proposal-.applies to -both the 
existing stock of local skilled force as well as to hew entrants; while the 
second proposal applies only to the latter. 
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35. Let the stream of earnings under the present salary scale be represented 
by x l s x2, xn 
X X x The present value (P.V.) of earnings = "1 + 2 + .... n = X 
( 1 + r ) (1+Y)2 (i+r)n 
Let us assume that it is proposed to reduce the P.V. of this stream of 
earnings by Y. This can be done either by a straight salary cut, by loan 
financing of education, or by national service. 
Alternative 1: salary reduction 
Let us assume a proportionate salary reduction of m1 
Therefore, P.V. of salary reduction = + + + .mAn = Y. 
(1+r) (1+r)2 (l+r)n 
The value of m can be determined from the above equation. 
Alternative 2: loan scheme 
Let i be equal annual instalments for h years towards loan repayment. 
i i i Therefore, P.V. of loan instalments = -rz \ + , :2+'' u = Y. (1+r) (1+r) (1+r) 
The value of i can be determined from the above equation. 
Alternative 3: national service 
Let national service rate represent p% reduction in salary over f years, 
. of 
px f 
Therefore, P.V reduction in salaries = L_Jl + + (1+r) (l+r)2 
(l+r)r = Y. 
The value of p can be determined from the above equation. The maximum 
reduction in salaries cannot exceed the amount of the loan granted. In 
the above analysis, we have abstracted from the complications introduced 
by taxes. 
36. Strictly speaking, this will be true only if training and educational institu-
tions charge true economic costs to the students. Under the present system, 
even those who are supposed to be paying their own way, do in fact enjoy 
considerable hidden subsidy from the state. 
37. This certainly appears to have been the experience of the National Board 
for Prices and Incomes in U.K.; See its General Report, April 1965 to 
July 1966 (Cmnd. 3087), pp. 18-21. 
